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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the relationships between remittances, elections, and government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP. We combine data from the National Elections across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov 
(2012) and the World Development Indicators dataset. We focus on 70 young democracies in 
the developing world. The period under investigation is 1990-2010.  
The main objective of the paper is to assess whether remittances have an influence on the 
political manipulation, which may occur prior to an election, through in increase in the 
government consumption-to-GDP-ratio. It appears that remittances dampen the political 
business cycle (PBC). Furthermore, the PBC is reduced up to the point where it is fully 
cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7 percent of GDP. Those findings are robust to 
different econometric strategies and robustness checks. 
 
JEL Classification: F24, F22, O15. 
 
Keywords: Political Business Cycles, Remittances 
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1. Introduction 
According to the recent World Bank Report (World Bank “Migration and Remittances 
Factbook”, 2011), the worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded $440 
billion in 2010. From that amount, developing countries received $325 billion. The Report 
also highlights that recorded remittances were nearly three times the amount of official aid 
(ODA) and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. 
For instance in Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances range from less than 1% of GDP to 25% in 
Lesotho, and they exceed by large both FDI and aid in countries like Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and Lesotho. Ratha (2009) summarized all existing empirical 
evidence and conclude that for a large fraction of the poorest nations, remittances exceed both 
ODA and FDI. A vast literature has highlighted the contrasted macroeconomic consequences 
of remittances for recipient countries on investment and growth (Chami et al., 2003; Bhaskara 
Rao and Mainul Hassan, 2011), consumption (Itzigsohn, 1995; Chami et al., 2003, 2005), and 
poverty (Combes, Ebeke, Maurel, 2012). Micro studies provide also an evidence of mixed 
results reflecting the positive effects of remittances, which act as an insurance (Aggarwal and 
Horowitz, 2002; Gubert, 2002; Frankel, 2011, among others) and negative effects due to 
moral hazard (Funkhouser, 2006; Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2009, Bansak and 
Chezum, 2009, among others). 
In contrast to ODA and FDI, remittances embodies the movement of individuals, 
which may imply a strong moral, therefore political dimension. The literature on the political 
importance of migration is recent, and it is now well-documented, ranging from the impact of 
migration on democracy (Spilimbergo, 2009, Docquier and al., 2010), on norms - like fertility 
norms (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2012) and female political empowerment (Lodigiani and S. 
Salomone, 2012) and more broadly on institutions (Beine and Sekkat, 2012). A substantial 
part of this literature comes from political science. In that literature, one key issue is to 
identify who is the vector of migrants’ political influence. A first vector can be political 
activists and elites, educated abroad, who hold the responsibility for importing policies from 
foreign countries. A second vector is non-elite but nevertheless specialized or skilled 
migrants, members of organized diasporas and students educated abroad for instance, who can 
influence policy choices. The influential work of Spilimbergo (2009), showing that only 
skilled migrants in democratic countries are capable of promoting democratic diffusion, 
belongs to this latter category. The third and last vector is the mass public, like the many 
ordinary Mexicans residents in the US, who adopt more democratic attitudes and habits and 
subsequently diffuse those attitudes in their origin country (Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 
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2012). Our study is based also on the belief that democratic life is shaped by mass public 
opinion. Therefore we do not emphasize exceptional (or even more educated) actors, but 
ordinary people who vote.  
While migrants’ behaviors have been extensively scrutinized, the political role played 
by remittances has been relatively neglected. Several papers investigate two causal relations, 
running from politics to remittances and vice et versa. First, political systems can influence 
the amount of remittances. Using  a panel of remittances of 109 developing countries from 
1990 to 2005, and the 2000 and 2006 Mexican Presidential elections, O’Mahony (2012) 
provides evidence that remittances are more important in election years, this effect being even 
greater the more competitive the election. The causality is running the other way around as 
well. Remittances cause the quality of institutions. According to Abdid et al. (2012), 
remittances, as an exogenous source of income, deteriorate the institutional quality. They 
strengthen the financial independence of recipient households and hence relax the control 
exercised by citizens over the public action and lead to greater corruption. Nevertheless, this 
moral hazard effect of remittances is disputed. Docquier et al., (2011) demonstrate that 
emigration impacts the political structure through the presence of return migrants from 
democratic countries (see also, Batista and Vicente, 2011). This effect is channeled through 
the exit option provided by migration but also through the exchange of ideas within the 
diaspora and between households and their relatives abroad. It is likely that communication 
and remittances are joint products: tighter financial ties mean more information exchange on 
cultural, technical but also political innovations. The international diffusion of better political 
practices through the migration network could be interpreted as a major positive spillover 
effect of globalization.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to put in light an effect of remittances on political systems 
through an original channel: the Political Budget Cycle (PBC). Section II presents the 
theoretical framework, which consists in adapting the PBC model to the presence of 
remittances. We make the usual assumption that governments are more likely to be re-elected 
when they are either competent or whenever they can manipulate myopic or sub-informed 
voters by engineering spurious good economic conditions prior to the election year. In the 
latter case, their room of maneuver is shown to be limited by globalization: the type of 
exchange rate regime and the extent of trade openness. O’Mahony (2012) uses interaction 
terms to test the hypothesis that PBC are weakened in more open countries and where 
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exchange rates are flexible. In a similar vein, we investigate whether remittances, as a key 
dimension of financial flows to developing countries, dampen or not PBC.  
Furthermore, it has been shown also that international aid and the presence of a natural 
resource  increase the desire of a government to be re-elected and the incentive to engage into 
fiscal manipulation. In a complementary way, Faye and Niehaus (2011) have shown that aid 
is bigger in election years, and even bigger in more aligned countries. From the PBC 
perspective, remittances have specific characteristics that strongly distinguish them from 
foreign aid: they are not channeled by public budgets, they are small financial transactions 
and they can involve information flows between recipients and donors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical 
arguments for a potential effect of remittances on the magnitude of the PBC. Section 3 
describes the baseline econometric strategy and discusses preliminary results. Section 4 
proposes a number of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.  
 2. The theoretical arguments: Remittances and political budget cycle 
 
In this paper, the political influence of remittances is embedded in the PBC theoretical 
framework. A vast literature applies the PBC theory in advanced countries (e.g. Alesina et al., 
1997; Drazen, 2001) or developing countries (Schuknecht, 1996, 2000; Kraemer, 1997; 
Khemani, 2004); as well as a worldwide sample of countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006). This 
literature assesses the influence of the electorate calendar on fiscal variables. Opportunistic 
incumbents can manipulate fiscal instruments thereby increasing the probability of their 
reelection, provided the existence of information asymmetries on the competence of the 
incumbent, as modeled by signaling or moral hazard games (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1990).  
Two issues must be addressed by the empirical setting. The first one concerns the 
definition of the distorted fiscal variable. The simplest hypothesis is to consider the 
government surplus (Shi and Svensson, 2006) assuming that tax cuts or public spending 
booms increase the welfare of voters. This assumption will hold under the condition that 
myopic voters are not going to penalize the incumbents, who deteriorate public finances to 
satisfy the lobbies (Drazen and Eslava, 2005). But in most cases voters are conservative, or 
they become more conservative by learning how a democracy is functioning.  
A more realistic hypothesis is to focus on the composition of public spending. The 
incumbent can increase the share of “visible” public spending before elections: current 
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spending (Rogoff, 1990) or investment spending (Eslava, 2005). Current spending is assumed 
to be immediately “visible” and to benefit to the median voter, while investment spending is 
considered as private information and is manipulated through targeting specific groups of 
interest. Vergne (2009) focuses on the political economy of public spending and on the 
modification of its composition prior to election years. In this paper, we consider government 
consumption over GDP. 1 
The second concern is about the heterogeneity of the PBC across countries, which 
calls for a large set of control variables. Pre electoral manipulations depend on various 
factors: age of democracy (Brender and Drazen, 2005), access to medias (Shi and Svensson, 
2006), level of GDP per capita ((Brender and Drazen, 2005), institutional characteristics (Shi 
and Svensson, 2006), exchange rate regime (O’Mahony, 2010), trade openness (O’Mahony, 
2006)?, natural resources endowments (Vergne, 2009), and foreign aid (Faye and Niehaus, 
2011). To the best of our knowledge, remittances have not been considered yet as influencing 
the PBC.  
 
The incumbent’s incentives to manipulate fiscal variables before elections result from 
an arbitrage between benefits and costs. Shi and Svensson (2006) show that the higher the 
appropriable resources (oil, mineral, and foreign aid), the stronger the political benefit from 
biased election outcomes. In a different but complementary approach, Faye and Niehaus 
(2011) demonstrate that foreign aid is provided to more aligned countries during election 
years. Both arguments support the idea that aid will promote more political manipulation 
during competitive elections. In contrast to foreign aid, international remittances are not 
                                                 
1
 We also tried to use the public investment variable, but we did not find any robust relationship with elections in 
our sample, what suggests that the fiscal manipulation is more likely to be financed through current expenditures 
than capital ones, which mostly depend upon external grants and therefore are less concerned by discretionary 
fiscal policy The non-observance of a PBC on capital spending is also confirmed by Vergne (2009) in the case of 
developing countries. The author found that during election-years, public spending shifts towards more visible 
current expenditures, in particular wages and subsidies, and away from capital expenditures. Three other 
variables can be used to test the PBC in developing countries. For example, O’Mahony (2011) used the change 
in government debt as dependent variable. The main drawback with this measure is that changes in government 
debt can be due to debt restructuration and debt cancellation episodes, or simply changes in the composition of 
the debt portfolio. Ehrhart (2009) tested the existence of PBC on government tax revenues and found that the 
manipulation only holds in the case of indirect tax revenues (tax revenues on international trade and taxes on 
goods and services). Given the strong heterogeneity amongst our sample of developing countries regarding the 
importance of indirect taxes in total taxes (some countries are resource rich, some have the VAT, some are 
landlocked, etc), we prefer to base our estimates of the PBC using government spending, which is the main 
instrument of fiscal policy in developing countries. 
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directly taxed by governments, and they do not provide incentives for politicians to behave 
strategically before elections in the same way.2  
For what regards their impact of remittances on the PBC, two opposite mechanisms 
are to be highlighted.  
On the one hand, the recipient households can substitute public goods by private goods 
financed by remittances and therefore lose interest in public affairs (Abdid, Chami, Dagger 
and Montiel, 2012).3 Remittances play also an insurance role (Combes and Ebeke, 2011) that 
can be a substitute for a publicly funded social security system. When households are less 
involved in the monitoring of public policies, they search less information and hence become 
more vulnerable to electoral manipulation. In our model, this moral hazard problem generated 
by remittances should amplify PBC by decreasing the political cost of manipulation.  
On the other hand, remittances can improve the government accountability thereby 
reducing the opportunity costs of political participation (Tybursky, 2012). Likewise, 
remittances can undermine the clientelist system by ensuring financial independence to 
households. Weaker clientelist relationships leave room for the emergence of a political 
opposition that inflates the cost of electoral manipulation for the incumbent (Pfutze, 2012). 
Remittances will dampen or inflate the political cost of manipulation, implying that 
their net effect on the PBC  is a matter of empirics: positive is manipulation becomes easier, 
negative in the opposite case. The empirical analysis is developed in the subsequent sections.   
 
  
                                                 
2
 Nevertheless, a part of remittances could be indirectly seized by the governments through the broadening of the 
VAT base.  
3
  In the opposite way, it can be argued that public goods could be complements rather than substitutes for 
private goods. For instance public goods could raise the rate of return on private investment financed by 
remittances.  Nevertheless, remittances which allow reducing the household consumption instability (Combes 
and Ebeke, 2011) appear rather as a source of private consumption financing. Private education or health 
spending could achieve the same function than public spending.  
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3. Baseline estimates of the effects of remittances on the magnitude of the political 
budget cycle in Low Income countries 
 
3.1. Baseline Specifications  
 
The following dynamic panel models allow testing the hypothesis according to which 
the political budget cycle (PBC) depends on the dependency upon remittances. 
 
,  ,	



 ,    ,  ,  ,     ,					1 
where  represents the government consumption-to-GDP ratio in each country  and 
year  ,  is the election dummy (taking 1 during the election year and 0, otherwise),  is the 
initial level of remittances (average remittance-to-GDP ratio over the past three years),  is 
the matrix of control variables, and , the country fixed effects, respectively. , is the error 
term. Equation [1] allows testing the hypothesis that the PBC on government expenditures 
would be lower as the size of remittance inflows increases.  
Therefore,  identifies the magnitude of the PBC for non-remittances dependent 
economies whereas   , denotes the magnitude of the PBC conditional on the strength 
of the remittance-dependency. The conditional PBC hypothesis implies a positive sign for . 
The sign of  depends on the net effect of remittances, which is negative (positive) if 
remittances decrease (increase) the cost of manipulation. Through the interactive term, the 
marginal impact of elections on government consumption depends upon remittances:   
 
!,
!,    , 
 
If   and   have opposite signs, a threshold level of remittance-to-GDP ratio arises: 
 
!,
!,    ,  0	 → 		
∗  %	 	 
 
measures the minimum remittances ratio required for a full neutralization of the PBC.  *R
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We follow Brender and Drazen (2005), and Shi and Svensson (2006) to specify 
Equation [1] as a standard dynamic panel data model and for the choice of control variables. 
We use up to three lags of the dependent variable as this allows us to get rid of the serial 
correlation in the residuals of the model. The presence of lagged dependent variables and the 
country-specific effects render the Ordinary Least Squares estimator (OLS) biased. Fixed-
Effects (FE) estimators can eliminate the country-specific effect. However, the bias caused by 
the inclusion of lagged dependent variables remains (see Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). Since 
the average number of observations across countries in our sample is 16, the bias of the FE 
estimator may be non-negligible. In order to avoid these problems, we adopt the System-
GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel data by Blundell and Bond (1998). Equations in 
levels and the equations in first differences are combined in a system and estimated with an 
extended System-GMM estimator which allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables as instruments. Furthermore, using initial remittances over 
the past three years reduces the potential endogeneity of remittances. In the framework, all the 
explanatory variables including the remittance variable and the interaction terms are treated as 
predetermined. Two specification tests check the validity of the instruments. The first is the 
standard Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines the 
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals.4 
 
 
The matrix of control variables in Equation [1] is chosen following Rodrik (1998). It 
includes variables such as trade openness, per capital real income, demographic dependency 
ratio and inflation. The model also allows controlling for cyclical conditions via the GDP 
growth rate variable and financing constraints through foreign aid.  
  
3.2. Data 
 
 Economic data come from various sources. For all the countries in the sample, the 
election dummy is drawn from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy 
(NELDA) dataset compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov (2012). The NELDA dataset 
provides detailed information on all election events from 1960-2010. In this paper we follow 
                                                 
4
 To deal with the well-known problem of instrument proliferation raised by the system-GMM estimator  
(Roodman, 2009), the matrix of instruments is collapsed and the number of lags is always set at a level which 
ensures that the number of instruments do not exceed the number of cross sections. 
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Shi and Svensson (2006) and only include legislative elections for countries with 
parliamentary political systems and executive elections for countries with presidential 
systems. Our sample of countries consists of Low Income and Lower Middle Income 
countries, according to the World Bank definition. It covers more than 70 countries and 
around 245 elections are retained in the analysis over the period 1990-2010. 
Remittance data are drawn from the World Development Indicators dataset. The 
variable records the money sent back at home by migrants living abroad as well as employee 
compensation, and finally migrants’ wealth transfers between countries. This broad definition 
is preferred since it maximizes the number of countries for which it’s possible to gather 
sufficient information regarding remittances. Moreover, we do not expect one particular type 
of remittances to have distinctive effects on PBC. The government consumption-to-GDP is 
drawn from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, whereas all the remaining 
explanatory variables are drawn from the World Development Indicators. 
 
3.3. Baseline Results 
 
Table 1 shows the estimation results of Equation [1]. In the first two columns, a linear effect 
of elections on government spending on current and capital goods is estimated, respectively. 
The purpose of these first investigations is to validate the form of PBC on government 
spending in the current sample. The models do not include therefore neither the remittance 
variable, nor the interaction term of elections crossed with remittance inflows. Results 
indicate that the occurrence of national elections leads on average to a 0.8 percentage point 
increase in government current expenditures during election years compared to other years 
(column 1).5 The increase in government consumption during election years is substantial. 
Indeed, for an in-sample mean of government consumption-to-GDP around 16 percent of 
GDP, the shift in government spending during election years represents an increase of about 5 
percent relative to the mean. 
  
  
                                                 
5
 Regarding the effect of elections on public investment, results indicate a negative although statistically 
insignificant effect of elections.  
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Table 1. Baseline estimates of the conditional political budget cycle in Low Income Countries 
  
System-
GMM 
System-
GMM 
System-
GMM 
Diff-
GMM 
System-
GMM+IV 
Dependent variable: Cons. Inv. Cons. Cons. Cons. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election dummy 0.792** -0.093 0.913*** 0.635** 0.799** 
(2.35) (0.50) (2.68) (2.15) (2.33) 
Election * Remittance-to-GDP -0.086** -0.052** -0.083** 
(2.19) (2.24) (1.99) 
Remittance-to-GDP -0.096 -0.009 0.023 
(0.71) (0.11) (0.25) 
            
Observations 1142 1038 996 925 996 
Countries 70 66 68 68 68 
Joint significance of election 
coefficients: P-value 0.021 0.067 0.057 
Remittance threshold (percent of GDP) 10.7 12.2 9.6 
Threshold's significance: P-value . . . 
Countries at and above the threshold 9 9 10 
Percentage of countries at and above the 
threshold 13.2 13.2 14.7 
m1:p-value 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.033 0.000 
m2:p-value 0.09 0.657 0.261 0.409 0.275 
Hansen OID test: P-value 0.182 0.206 0.262 0.446 0.184 
Number of instruments 37 51 45 41 46 
Notes: All equations are estimated using panel data estimators and include a full set of control variables 
(GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, inflation rate, population under 14, foreign aid-to-GNI, and trade 
openness). Cons: Government consumption as percentage of GDP; Inv: Public investment as percentage 
of GDP. In column 4, the GMM estimator is augmented with an external instrument for remittances 
which is the GDP per capita in migrant host countries. Robust and absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
  
 
 Column 3 of Table 1 estimates the full specification described in Equation [1]. The 
election effect is conditional upon the size of the remittance dependency. Results indicate a 
statistically significant non-linearity in the effect of elections on government consumption at 
10.7 percent level of significance (see the test of joint significance of the election coefficients 
at the bottom of Table 1). The coefficient associated with the additive term of the election 
dummy is positive and statistically significant whereas the coefficient associated with the 
interaction of election crossed with the remittance ratio exhibits a negative and significant 
sign. These results can be interpreted as follows: For a hypothetical Low Income country for 
which the remittance ratio is 0, the magnitude of the PBC is 0.9 percentage point of GDP. As 
long as the remittance-dependency increases, the PBC is significantly lower and is fully 
cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7 percent of GDP. This corresponds to about 14 
percent of the country-year observations in the sample used in column 3. Over the period 
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1990-2010, 9 countries in the sample posted an average remittance-to-GDP ratio exceeding 
10.7 percent of GDP (Albania, Cape Verde, Haiti, Lesotho, Moldova, El Salvador, and 
Yemen). 
 Similar results are obtained in column 4 where Equation [1] is estimated using the 
Difference GMM instead of the System-GMM technique. The Difference GMM allows 
estimating the model using moment conditions applied to the equation in first differences 
only. Results indicate a remittance threshold around 12 percent of GDP. 
 In column 5, we augment the standard System-GMM framework (which uses “ready –
made” instruments– the lagged values of the explanatory variables themselves as instruments) 
by adding an external instrument which is suggested by the recent empirical literature of 
remittances (Acosta et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011): economic conditions in migrant host 
countries proxied by the GDP per capita in migrant host countries.6 It’s now standard in the 
empirical literature to augment the precision of the GMM tool by adding external instruments 
(Acosta et al., 2009). The addition of external sources of exogenous variations should go 
some way towards vitiating the potential “weak instruments” problem that often arises in the 
context of traditional GMM. Results shown in column 5 do not reject the existence of a non-
linearity in the effect of elections on government spending and the threshold estimation is 
almost similar to the previous assessment. 
 We have established so far that remittance inflows tend to play a role in dampening the 
size of the PBC in Low Income countries by reducing the sensitivity of government spending 
to the occurrence of national elections. The next section tests the robustness of these findings. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 The GDP per capita of migrant host countries is computed as the weighted sum of GDP per capita of all 
potential destination countries with being the bilateral migration shares extracted from the Global Bilateral 
Migration Database published by the World Bank. Since the remittance variable enters the model as a rolling 
average over past three years, the external instrument is also computed to match the same exact frequency.  
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4. Robustness Checks 
 
4.1. Alternative Non-Linear Specifications 
 
Centering the remittance variable 
 
This section proposes an alternative functional form to test the PBC conditional on 
remittance inflows. One of the main drawbacks of the specification assumed in Equation [1] 
in that the coefficient  identifies the extreme case where remittance inflows equal 0 thus,  
does not represent an average impact.7 One way to overcome this restriction is to specify a 
model in which the remittance variable is centered on its sample mean (see Wooldridge, 2010; 
and Fafchamps and Vicente, 2009, for a detailed justification of this strategy). Equation [2] 
takes the following form: 
 
,  ,	



 &,  '   % (  ) % (  ,     ,					2 
 
where  ( is the in-sample mean of the remittance-to-GDP ratio (the average is about 
5.8 percent of GDP). In this specification, & identifies the magnitude of the PBC for the 
“average” remittance-dependent country and &  ' % (, represents the marginal 
impact of elections around the remittance average. We also expect & + . Indeed, if our 
assumption that remittances help to dampen the PBC is valid, one would expect the 
magnitude of the latter to be lower for the average remittance dependent country (& in 
Equation [2]), compared to a non-remittance-dependent country ( in Equation [1]). 
 Results are shown in Table 2. The main hypothesis of the paper is not 
statistically rejected by the data. The magnitude of the PBC on government spending is 
robustly dampened by the size of the remittance dependency. For the average remittance-
dependent economy, government consumption shifts by 0.4 percentage point of GDP during 
election years compared to the 0.9 percentage point of GDP estimated from Equation [1] in 
the case of non-remittance dependent economies. For countries receiving more than the in-
sample average of remittances, the PBC is even more reduced as indicated by the coefficient 
                                                 
7
 Imposing such a restriction could be misleading insofar as the in-sample remittance data do not exactly include 
0. The minimum value of the remittance-to-GDP ratio across the specifications is 0.004 percent of GDP. 
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of the interaction term of elections crossed with the centered remittance variable which 
exhibits a negative and significant sign.  
 
The threshold level of remittances at which the PBC is fully neutralized stands at 12.5 
percent of GDP (13.2 percent of the countries fall into this category).  
 
Table 2. Alternative specifications for threshold determination 
  (1) (2) 
Election dummy 0.415* 0.797** 
(1.72) (2.49) 
Election * Centered Remittance-to-GDP -0.062** 
(2.28) 
Centered Remittance-to-GDP -0.217 
(1.05) 
Election * 1[Remittance-to-GDP>10.1%] -1.898*** 
(2.73) 
1[Remittance-to-GDP>10.1%] -1.064 
(1.27) 
      
Observations 996 996 
Countries 68 68 
Joint significance of election coefficients: P-value 0.021 0.013 
Remittance threshold (percent of GDP) 12.5 10.1 
Threshold's significance: P-value . . 
Countries at and above the threshold 9 10 
Percentage of countries at and above the threshold 13.2 14.7 
m1:p-value 0.003 0.001 
m2:p-value 0.279 0.209 
Hansen OID test: P-value 0.27 0.317 
Number of instruments 55 45 
Notes: The dependent variable is the government consumption as percentage 
of GDP. Models are estimated using the System-GMM estimator and include a 
full set of control variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, inflation rate, 
population under 14, foreign aid-to-GNI). Robust and absolute  t statistics in 
parentheses. 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Rolling estimations 
 
An alternative model for the conditional PBC is implemented with rolling estimations 
for the different values taken by the remittance ratio. A new variable ,,- , in interaction with 
the election dummy variable was specified; ,,-   is equal to 1 if the country has a remittance 
ratio greater than ∗ and 0 otherwise. This methodology for threshold determination in the 
case of endogenous regressors under a dynamic panel data framework has previously been 
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implemented by Masten et al. (2008) and Chami et al. (2009).8 The following equation is 
specified: 
 
,  ,	



 .,  /  ,,-   0,,-  ,     ,					1 
 
where  ,,-  1 2 ∗. 
 
The top 5% and bottom 5% of the observations of the remittance ratio were dropped to 
ensure feasible identification of the threshold. Remittance-to-GDP thresholds were explored 
in increments of 0.5 percent of GDP. Each equation corresponding to a different threshold 
was estimated by the System-GMM method. Under the System-GMM framework, the optimal 
threshold is the one that maximizes the overidentification Hansen test p-value and the second-
order autocorrelation p-value. Testing nonlinear effects simply refers to the test of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient for the interactive variable / is equal to zero. 
The optimal cutoff which maximizes the Hansen test and second-order autocorrelation 
test p-values is a level of remittance ratio equal to 10.1 percent of GDP (Table 2, column 2). 
Almost 15 percent of the countries meet this threshold. The corresponding estimation is 
shown in Table 2, column 2. All the diagnostic tests associated with the System-GMM 
estimator also validate the specification. The table reports a significant and negative impact of 
the interactive term and a positive and significant effect of the additive term of elections. This 
uncovers the existence of two regimes. The first regime is characterized by a higher PBC, 
around 0.8 percentage point of GDP, for a remittance ratio below 10 percent of GDP). The 
second regime (remittance ratio exceeding 10 percent of GDP) is characterized by a lower and 
almost null marginal impact of elections on government spending (the sum of coefficients 
associated with the election dummy is not statistically different from 0).9 
 
  
                                                 
8
 Another approach might consist of estimation using the Caner and Hansen (2004) methodology but with the 
assumption that the threshold variable is exogenous in a non-dynamic model. However, these restrictions seem 
very difficult to apply in our context. 
9
 The standard error of the threshold level is computed using a delta method that is by taking a first-order Taylor 
approximation around the mean. Notice that in small samples, the delta method is known to result in excessively 
large standard errors. 
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4.2. Endogeneity of election timing 
  
A potential critique of the results presented so far could be that treated elections as 
predetermined in the GMM specification will not entirely solve the potential endogeneity of 
this variable with regard to fiscal policy. For example, both timing of elections and fiscal 
policies could be influenced by a number of unobserved time-varying factors (crises, 
commodity price shocks, natural disasters) which are not included in the models.  Another 
potential problem is that the incumbent politicians may strategically choose the timing of 
elections conditional on fiscal policy outcomes, causing a reverse causality problem. As 
discussed in Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006), one way to address the 
endogeneity bias from reverse causation or from shocks affecting both the election date and 
the fiscal variable is to separate out those elections whose timing is pre-determined. We do 
this by looking at the constitutionally determined election interval taking as pre-determined 
those elections which were held either at the fixed interval or within the expected year of the 
constitutionally fixed term. We follow the definition used in the NELDA database and 
examine whether these elections were held early or late relative to the date they were 
supposed to be held per established procedure. Endogenous elections are the ones that do not 
occur at a date set by the constitution. 
We checked the robustness of our results in three ways. First, a model similar to 
Equation [1] is specified with two election dummies (predetermined and endogenous 
elections). Second, a revised version of Equation [2] is estimated where the two election 
dummies enter the model and the remittance variable centered on its mean. Third, the 
conditional PBC is examined by running rolling regressions augmented with the two election 
dummies to fine-tune the remittance threshold as in Equation [3]. 
Results of all these investigations are presented in Table 3. In all three cases, the 
interaction term of predetermined elections crossed with the remittance variable exhibits a 
significant and negative sign. The threshold levels associated with remittances are relatively 
lower than the previous assessments: They vary between 6 and 7 percent of GDP across 
columns 1 and 3. It’s worth noting that in the case of threshold determined after centering the 
remittance variable in the model (column 2) the coefficient associated with the additive term 
of predetermined elections is positive but statistically insignificant. This suggests that at 
already a remittance ratio close to the remittance sample mean, the PBC is no longer at play. 
This is quite different from the results obtained in the column 1 of Table 2. Therefore, it 
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seems that accounting for the endogeneity of the election timing matters in the estimation of 
the conditional PBC.  
 
Table 3. Accounting for the endogeneity of elections 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Predetermined election dummy 0.805** 0.103 0.582* 
(2.11) (0.48) (1.82) 
Predetermined election * Remittance-to-GDP -0.122** 
(2.50) 
Predetermined election * Centered Remittance-to-GDP -0.119*** 
(2.79) 
Predetermined election * 1[Remittance-to-GDP>7.6%] -1.423** 
(2.06) 
Endogenous election dummy 0.731 0.586 0.468 
(1.14) (0.96) (0.79) 
Endogenous election * Remittance-to-GDP -0.029 
(0.57) 
Endogenous election * Centered Remittance-to-GDP -0.009 
(0.20) 
Endogenous election * 1[Remittance-to-GDP>7.6%] -1.577 
(0.90) 
Remittance-to-GDP -0.034 
(0.30) 
Centered Remittance-to-GDP -0.069 
(0.46) 
1[Remittance-to-GDP>7.6%] 0.000 
(0.00) 
  
Observations 975 975 975 
Countries 68 68 68 
Joint significance of election coefficients: P-value 0.043 0.020 0.099 
Remittance threshold (percent of GDP) 6.6 6.7 7.6 
Threshold's significance: P-value . . . 
Countries at and above the threshold 18 18 13 
Percentage of countries at and above the threshold 26.5 26.5 19.1 
m1:p-value 0.003 0.003 0.002 
m2:p-value 0.32 0.318 0.294 
Hansen OID test: P-value 0.188 0.280 0.310 
Number of instruments 53 53 53 
Notes: The dependent variable is the government consumption as percentage of GDP. Models 
are estimated using the System-GMM estimator and include a full set of control variables (GDP 
per capita, GDP growth rate, inflation rate, population under 14, foreign aid-to-GNI). Robust 
and absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recent literature has highlighted that remittances are a very significant macro-
phenomenon: they have a big impact on growth, poverty, investment and consumption. 
Contrary to ODA, remittances go directly into the pockets of the recipients. While ODA has 
been shown to increase directly the political benefit for a government to be re-elected, 
remittances have no direct link with the incentives for political manipulation.  
This paper makes the assumption that there is an indirect link. Remittances may 
increase the political indifference of voters with respect to the public affairs, but they can also 
be a vehicle of idea and norms. In the former case, the political cost of manipulating is 
reduced, while in the latter case, it is inflated. The net effect is a matter of empirics. 
This paper addresses the question of how much government current spending in 
percentage of GDP will increase or decrease prior to an election, when remittances interact 
with the timing of an election. The results are following: for a hypothetical Low Income 
country for which the remittance ratio is nil, the magnitude of the PBC is 0.9 percentage point 
of GDP. As long as the remittance-dependency increases, the PBC is reduced up to the point 
where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7 percent of GDP. In other 
words, we reveal the existence of two regimes. The first regime is characterized by a higher 
PBC, around 0.8 percentage point of GDP, for a remittance ratio below 10 percent of GDP). 
The second regime (remittance ratio exceeding 10 percent of GDP) is characterized by a 
lower and almost null marginal impact of elections on government spending (the sum of 
coefficients associated with the election dummy is not statistically different from 0). More 
globalized countries are therefore less exposed to political manipulation.  
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